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Abstract
Analysis of climate and other environmental questions on regional surveys conducted over
2017–2020 (9,000+ live telephone interviews) elaborate on the well-known importance of
political factors by adding support for three newer but replicated propositions. (1) Strength of
political identification predicts climate-change views within the ranks of conservatives to a much
greater degree than within ranks of liberals, evidence that conservatives’ climate-change views
are more politically determined. (2) Factor analysis suggests that climate-change beliefs meet
statistical criteria for being an indicator of sociopolitical identity, alongside the traditional
indicators of ideology and party, or the newer one of Trump support. This result underlines the
need for caution when interpreting models that include climate beliefs in addition to other
identity indicators such as party or ideology among their independent variables. (3) Having
mostly same-party friends intensifies the already-strong effects of political identity on views
regarding climate change, local weather, conservation, renewable energy, and wildlife
management. Twelve examples show multiplicative (interaction) effects of political identity and
same-party friends across different dependent variables, political indicators and datasets. These
identity×friends results build upon other recent studies, confirming that sociopolitical feedbacks
accentuate political divisions on the environment, and particularly so among conservatives.

1. Introduction
A formulaic introduction for social-science papers on anthropogenic climate change starts by
noting the disconnect between an overwhelming consensus among climate scientists, on the one
hand, and deep divisions in US public opinion, on the other. Those public divisions primarily
reflect conservative rejection of the scientific consensus, leading to strong correlations between
political-identity indicators (such as party or ideology) and climate beliefs, which have been
replicated in every study that looked. Other respondent characteristics such as age, gender and
physical location affect climate views too, but political identity tends to dominate (Shwom et al.
2015).
In US data, political identity often moderates the effects of education. Agreement with the
scientific consensus on climate change tends to rise with education or science literacy among
liberals and moderates, whereas it shows no relationship or even declines with education/literacy
among conservatives (Drummond and Fischhoff 2017; Hamilton 2008, 2011; Hamilton et al.
2012, 2015a; Kahan et al. 2012; McCright and Dunlap 2011; Shao et al. 2014). A similar
interaction between objectively-tested knowledge and political identity has been observed in
Australian data as well (Tranter 2019). Studies elsewhere have rarely tested for such interactions,
but their results often do agree with the main-effects pattern that acceptance of anthropogenic
climate change rises with education, and declines with conservative identity (Devine-Wright et
al. 2015; Gregersen et al. 2020; McCright et al. 2015, 2016; Tranter 2017). Self-assessed
understanding, sometimes used as a proxy for knowledge, exhibits political
identity×understanding interactions with a similar flavor (Hamilton 2011; McCright and Dunlap

3
2011). Interpretation of self-assessments is tricky, however, because they mix respondents’
actual knowledge with their political certainty — especially among conservatives (Hamilton
2015a, 2018).
The frequent occurrence of political identity×education-type interaction effects in US (and now
Australian) data undermines conclusions about education from studies that do not explicitly test
for such interactions. Common explanations for the interactions invoke information-filtering
processes, positing that better-educated individuals are more efficacious in acquiring information
that reinforces prejudices and fits with their social identity. Theoretical concepts associated with
information filtering include biased assimilation (Corner et al. 2012; Ehret et al. 2017; McCright
and Dunlap 2011), compensatory control (Kay et al. 2009), cultural cognition (Kahan et al.
2011), elite cues (Brulle et al. 2012; Carmichael and Brulle 2017; Darmofal 2005), motivated
reasoning (Druckman and McGrath 2019; Kraft et al. 2015; Kunda 1990; Taber and Lodge
2006), reinforcing spirals (Feldman et al. 2014; Slater 2007) and solution aversion (Campbell
and Kay 2014).
Although they share common insights that people selectively acquire information that supports
their prejudices, these concepts differ in their details. Elite cues, for example, refers to a topdown process by which political leaders, activists or media inform followers about identityconsistent positions. Rejection of anthropogenic climate change, initially spread by fossil fuel
interests and conservative think tanks to political leaders and media, and from there to the base,
provides one striking example (Jacques et al. 2008; Dunlap and McCright 2015). Even more
striking has been the politicization of US response to the COVID-19 pandemic, spreading rapidly
from President Trump to supporting politicians, media and voters (Adolph et al. 2020). In both
cases, however, we see bottom-up processes like biased assimilation at work too, as people
attend to and accept/reject information sources, arguments and leaders based on fit with their
own sociopolitical identity. The top-down and bottom-up dynamics form a reinforcing spiral.
Implicitly symmetrical language of “polarization” or “partisanship” has characterized much
social-science writing, but left/right asymmetry appears in numerous studies (Jost 2017; van der
Linden et al. 2020). Conservatives tend to have more politically homogeneous networks on
online platforms such as Twitter (Boutyline and Willer 2017), are more politically selective in
choosing their sources of information (Rodriguez et al. 2017), pay closer attention to cues about
identity-appropriate views (Bullock 2011; Carmichael et al. 2017), show greater interest in
ideologically compatible fake news (Guess et al. 2018), and are more inclined to conspiratorial
thinking (van der Linden et al. 2020). One reflection of conservatives’ conspiratorial thinking is
their lower trust in scientists, both generally and across a range of specific topics (Gauchat 2012;
Hamilton 2015b; Lewandowsky et al. 2020; Nadelson et al. 2014) including vaccines and
pandemics (Hamilton et al. 2015b; Hamilton and Safford 2020). Most recently, conservative
science rejection has been a striking feature of US public reactions to the crisis of COVID-19
(Brzezinski et al. 2020; Cassese et al. 2020; Lewandowsky and Cook 2020; Safford and
Hamilton 2020; multiple polls linked in Saletan 2020).
A more mundane realm of demonstrated asymmetry involves perceptions of local weather.
Subjective recollections of weather — extreme events, recent experience, or longer trends —
often correlate with climate-change beliefs. Such correlations might reflect weather influencing
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beliefs, but are equally consistent with beliefs shaping perceptions of weather (Myers et al. 2013;
Shao 2015). A number of studies where the relevant weather events are known objectively find
that conservatives and individuals who reject the reality of anthropogenic climate change more
often report past weather that seems consistent with their position, whether accurately or not
(Borick and Rabe 2017; Hamilton and Lemcke-Stampone 2016; Hamilton et al. 2016a,b, 2018;
Howe and Leiserowitz 2013).
In this paper we examine details of the relationship between political identity, views on climate
change, and other environmental opinions. The depth of political divisions on climate and
environmental topics is well established, but our analysis brings up less obvious points consistent
with several recent studies. These points involve asymmetry in how the strength of partisan
identity affects environmental opinions; statistically evaluating climate beliefs as being
themselves a valid indicator (alongside ideology and party) for sociopolitical identity; and testing
for multiplicative effects from having friends mostly of your same party. Our analysis considers
data from three US regional survey projects. Although regional surveys do not provide a
nationwide picture, for environmental research they have the advantage of raising issues with
tangible, place-relevant importance such as local weather, wind power development or wildlife
management. Generality of regional-survey results can be explored through replication across
different regions and issues, as we begin to do here.

2. Data and Methods
This analysis brings together data from three recent projects that carried out regional surveys in
northern New England, the Intermountain West and New Hampshire. These three projects
focused on different and often locally-salient topics, but their surveys shared similar methods,
and some common questions on climate change and the environment. For each survey, trained
interviewers at the University of New Hampshire (UNH) Survey Center called randomlyselected cell and landline telephone numbers, then applied a rule (adult with most recent
birthday) to randomly choose interviewees within households. Following data collection,
probability weights were calculated to adjust for design bias (number of adults and telephone
numbers in each household; population of each county). Weighting based on Census population
profiles allowed further adjustments to achieve results close to representative for the study
regions regarding age, sex and education. Such weights have been applied consistently to all
graphs and analysis in this paper, as with other publications using these datasets.
Northeast Oregon and the North Country both are rural regions that have experienced declines in
their historically resource-based economies, offset to variable degrees by service-sector and
amenity-based development. Politically, northeast Oregon could be described as conservative.
Trump won 65 to 71 percent of the votes from these counties in 2016, and acceptance of humancaused climate change falls below national levels (ranging from 38 to 48 percent in northeast
Oregon surveys conducted over 2011–2018; see Hamilton et al. 2016a, 2019 and Hartter et al.
2020). North Country politics are more moderate. Trump votes ranged from 38 to 52 percent in
these counties in 2016, and anthropogenic climate change achieves close to national recognition
(65 percent on the 2017 North Country survey, compared with 64 percent on a nationwide survey
that asked the same question the previous year; see Hamilton et al. 2019). Compared with
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northeast Oregon or the North Country, the state of New Hampshire is larger, with greater urban
populations and economic diversity. About 47 percent of state voters chose Trump in 2016,
compared with 46 percent nationwide. Although New Hampshire’s population includes
proportionately fewer minorities and more college graduates than the US as a whole, statewide
surveys on science/environment topics often yield results that are close to those of nationwide
surveys (e.g., Hamilton 2016). For example, a nationwide survey in late summer/fall 2016 found
64 percent agreement that climate change is happening now, caused mainly by human activities.
Contemporaneous statewide New Hampshire surveys likewise found 64 percent agreement
(Hamilton et al. 2019). Our three regional survey projects, and their common climate-change
question, are described in more detail below.
There is a two-county geographical overlap between the North Country and New Hampshire
surveys. These two counties contribute less than 9 percent of the New Hampshire data, however,
and there should be little overlap in respondents from the independently-drawn samples.
2.1. Three survey projects
North Country: In summer 2017, survey by researchers at the Carsey School of Public Policy
(University of New Hampshire, UNH) interviewed 1,650 residents of four rural counties of
northern New England: Oxford County, Maine; Essex County, Vermont; Coös and Grafton
Counties, New Hampshire. Interviewing was done by trained personnel at the UNH Survey
Center (response rate 19%, calculated by AAPOR 2016 definition 3). Interviewers asked
residents’ views on conditions and challenges in their communities, with some questions
replicating earlier surveys from 2007 and 2010. Hamilton and coauthors (2017) draw basic
comparisons across the counties and survey years. Focusing on two climate-related questions,
Hamilton et al. (2018) observed a new interaction effect: having mostly same-party friends
intensified partisan divisions not only on the reality of anthropogenic climate change, but on an
earlier question that simply asked whether recent winters in that region have, on average, been
warmer (factually true). Similar interactions affecting two other environmental opinion items not
investigated for the 2018 paper are documented below.
Northeast Oregon: The interdisciplinary Communities and Forests in Oregon (CAFOR) project
carried out four surveys in this region from 2011 to 2018. The most recent of these surveys,
analyzed here, involved 1,097 interviews done in September 2018 (response rate 25%) with
residents of Baker, Union and Wallowa Counties. Earlier northeast Oregon CAFOR surveys
have been described in papers focusing on land use, resources, wildfire and climate topics (e.g.,
Boag et al. 2015, Hamilton et al. 2016a, Hartter et al. 2018). Interaction effects recently noted by
Hamilton et al. (2020) and Hartter et al. (2020) are reviewed here, along with a new analysis
showing similar effects on renewable-energy views.
New Hampshire: The Granite State Poll (GSP) interviews statewide random samples of about
500 New Hampshire residents four times each year. The GSP is best known for its political
polling, and routinely asks a wider range of political questions than did the North Country or
northeast Oregon surveys. Consequently, our political analysis can be more detailed with these
New Hampshire data. In addition, the Granite State Poll often carries environmental or science
questions for basic research, which through years of repetition have shown high stability and
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criterion validity (e.g., Hamilton et al. 2015a). Median GSP response rate was 17% over the
period analyzed in this paper (February 2017 to February 2020). With a standard climate-change
question as dependent variable, having mostly same-party friends proves to strengthen the effects
of four different indicators for political identity.
Sampling and telephone interviews for all three surveys followed consistent protocols,
implemented by the UNH Survey Center. Sampling weights, employed with all graphs and
analyses in this paper, permit adjustments for known design and response bias to achieve more
representative results. All three surveys carried similar demographic items along with regionallyappropriate environmental questions.
2.2. Variable definitions and coding
Table 1 lists questions providing dependent variables for this paper: items about climate change,
local weather, renewable energy, and regional environment. Codes used for subsequent logit
regression modeling are listed as well. The general climate changing item, common across all
three surveys, has been asked on dozens of different regional and nationwide surveys (e.g.,
Hamilton et al. 2015a, 2019). Our analysis of this variable will focus on one particular response:
“climate change is happening now, caused mainly by human activities.” This was the most
popular choice on all surveys, and has straightforward interpretation as agreement with the
scientific consensus (corresponding, for example, to the first sentence in AGU 2019). The
climate changing/human caused response has shown replicable results across tens of thousands
of interviews. In contrast, other responses to the climate changing question are less stable and
harder to interpret because the “not changing” and “caused by natural forces” options both
appeal, at different times, to people whose bedrock position is rejection of human-caused climate
change. Historically, during a 1998–2013 period when average global temperatures changed
relatively little (described by some as a global-warming “hiatus” or “pause”), conservative
commentators claimed that global warming had stopped, or never existed. Then as global
temperatures climbed rapidly in subsequent years, that rise was blamed on El Niño, nominally a
natural cause (Nuccitelli 2017). In effect, conservative discourse pivoted from “not changing” to
“changing but naturally caused,” which might seem mutually incompatible but more basically
deny the reality of human-caused change.
<<Table 1 about here>>
Following similar logic to focus on the most interpretable and salient response in each case, other
dependent variables in Table 1 have also been dichotomized for logit analysis. This
simplification offers statistical as well as substantive advantages. Multi-category models (e.g.,
ordered logit or multinomial logit) yield conclusions that broadly agree with dichotomous
results, but tend to be less interpretable, replicable or robust as they estimate more parameters
from thinner categories, such as the 4 percent of North Country respondents who said that
climate change is not happening now. A multinomial logit model for climate changing requires
four times as many parameters but achieves little improvement in fit, compared with binomial
logit.
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Table 2 lists indicators for sociopolitical identity, also shown with codes used for modeling. The
indicators include standard items for ideology, party, and approval of President Trump. Party is
represented by 7-category (party7) or 4-category (party4) indicators — the latter distinguishing
the distinctively conservative category of Tea Party supporters, as proposed by Hamilton and
Saito (2015; also see Leiserowitz et al. 2011; Shao 2017). Path analysis by Bolin and Hamilton
(2018) examined connections in earlier surveys between Watch Fox News and party, ideology
and beliefs about climate change. Friends is the newest question in our present analysis, making
explicit the “socio” part of sociopolitical by asking whether most of the respondent’s friends
prefer the same party they do. This question was first tested on the 2017 North Country survey,
where significant party4×friends interactions were found to affect responses to both recent
winters warmer and climate changing (Hamilton et al. 2018). Testing for replicability of such
interactions, the friends question was later asked on northeast Oregon and New Hampshire
surveys.
<<Table 2 about here>>
As coding in Table 3 indicates, most of the political-identity indicators are treated as ordinal
predictors in the regression models that follow, as they were in the earlier studies cited. Such
treatment is supported by monotonic and approximately linear effects observed in many datasets
(examples relevant here are graphed in Hamilton et al. 2016b, 2018, 2020). Alternative treatment
of political indicators as collections of unordered categories tends to yield broadly similar results
but with fussier interpretation and less replicability. More importantly, an unordered-category
approach for political indicators discards what we know about ordinality of the phenomena itself.
3. Climate Views and Political Identity
Strong correlations between political identity and public views on climate change have been
documented across countless US datasets (e.g., Hamilton et al. 2015a; McCright and Dunlap
2011; Marquart-Pyatt et al. 2014), and a growing number from other countries (e.g., Gregersen et
al. 2020; McCright et al. 2015; Tranter 2017). Political identity is most often represented by
questions about ideology or political party, concepts that seem theoretically distinct — but in
recent US data appear practically interchangeable, in terms of their correlations with other
variables. Using ideology, party and two other indicators for political identity available in our
New Hampshire dataset, Figure 1 shows the strong gradients on agreement that climate change
is happening now, caused mainly by human activities. The number of observations varies from
panel to panel in Figure 1 and elsewhere in this paper, as we employ the maximum available
dataset (rather than listwise deletion) for best precision in each analysis. Results are noisier but
yield substantially similar conclusions if we instead limit analysis to a smaller subset of
interviews that all asked the same questions.
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Figure 1: Agreement that climate change is happening now, and caused mainly by human activities,
correlates strongly with four indicators for sociopolitical identity (definitions in Tables 1–2). Data from
2017–2020 statewide New Hampshire surveys; for background and other references on these surveys
see Bolin and Hamilton 2018; Hamilton et al. 2019.

At least 89 percent of those who identify as liberals (Figure 1a) agree with the scientific
consensus that humans are changing the climate; there is at most a weak gradient of a few points
across four steps from extremely liberal (96 percent) through fairly, somewhat or moderately
liberal (91 percent). Among conservatives, on the other hand, we see a steep gradient of 31
points from moderately conservative (50 percent) to extremely conservative (19 percent). The
political party question in Figure 1b offers just seven response categories, but exhibits a similar
pattern: strong Democrats, not very strong Democrats (abbreviated to “Weak Dem” for the
graphic) and independents closer to Democrats (“Ind Dem”) all express around 90 percent
agreement with the scientific consensus, whereas among Republicans, acceptance of climate
change falls as strength of partisanship rises. There is some indication that self-identified
independents closer to Republican (“Ind Rep”) actually are more partisan than the much smaller
group of not very strong Republicans (“Weak Rep”).
The finding in Figures 1a and 1b that climate-change views correlate with strength of ideological
or partisan identity among conservatives/Republicans, but not so among liberals/Democrats,
replicates a conclusion from nationwide data by Morin-Chassé and Lachapelle (2019). This
pattern implies that rejection of climate change is driven by political identity among
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conservatives, but less so among liberals, who might attend more to scientific reports, current
events or personal observations in forming their views. Whether partisan patterns reflect the topdown effects of elite cues (Darmofal 2005; Brulle et al. 2012), or the bottom-up effects of biased
assimilation (Corner et al. 2012; McCright and Dunlap 2011), such processes appear stronger
among conservatives (Hamilton 2018). Related evidence of asymmetry comes from a unique
panel study by Jenkins-Smith et al. (2020), who observe that Republican/conservative
individuals’ beliefs about climate change exhibit greater time-to-time variation, in no particular
direction, while Democrat/liberal individuals’ beliefs remain more stable. Their study attributes
this difference to Democrats/liberals receiving consistent messages from political leaders and
scientists, giving them less reason to change views; whereas for Republicans/conservatives the
political and scientific messages are diametrically opposed. A “mixed messages” conflict might
result in shifting views, particularly (looking again at Figures 1a and 1b) among less extreme
partisans.
Figures 1c and 1d chart climate views against two other political indicators that yield similarly
steep gradients. Acceptance of anthropogenic climate change falls from 92 percent among people
who strongly disapprove of President Trump to 26 percent among those who strongly approve.
Several recent studies report that Trump approval or voting predicts climate-change views as
well if not better than traditional ideology or party questions (Hamilton 2017, 2019; Shao and
Hao 2019). Trump approval, to a greater extent than other political indicators, exhibits a starkly
bimodal distribution: in these data more than 70% either strongly disapprove (45%) or strongly
approve (26%) of President Trump. Fewer than 4% say they “lean toward” approving or
disapproving. Despite the hollowed-out middle ground, Trump approval in Figure 1c exhibits a
milder version of the patterns seen in 1a and 1b: views on anthropogenic climate change
correlate with strength of partisan identification to a greater degree among conservatives (31point gradient from lean approval to strongly approve) than they do among liberals (18-point
gradient from lean disapproval to strongly disapprove).
The Fox News question also does not find much middle ground; 51% say they never watch.
Among those who do watch, we see a climate-change gradient consistent with previous studies
(Bolin and Hamilton 2018; Feldman et al. 2012; Krosnick and MacInnis 2010). Figure 1d shows
recognition of anthropogenic climate change falling from 81 percent among those who say they
never watch Fox News to just 23 percent among those who watch it every day. Other analyses
(not shown, but parallel to comparisons by party in Hamilton 2018) find that daily watchers of
Fox News tend to be less accurate on climate-related but belief-neutral knowledge questions,
from the meaning of “greenhouse effect” to the location of the North Pole.
Entered together in a principal components factor analysis, ideology, party, Trump approval and
Fox News viewing all load on one underlying dimension. By this rough statistical criterion, the
four indicators could arguably be viewed as proxies for a single latent variable: political identity.
Moreover, if climate changing responses are entered along with the other four indicators, all five
variables load on a single dimension, which explains 68 percent of the cumulative variance
(Table 3). This first principal component is the only one with an eigenvalue above 1.0,
indicating that further components account for less than a single indicator’s variance; they are
worse than useless in terms of simplifying the data. The first component’s theta reliability, a
special case of Cronbach’s alpha that is appropriate for principal components, is θ = 0.88. These
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basic results in Table 3 agree with a psychometric analysis by Dan Kahan, who showed that
ideology, party, and two items for global-warming beliefs could “all be viewed as measuring the
same thing: a latent (unobserved) disposition that causes different groups of people to adopt
coherent sets of opposing stances on political matters” (Kahan 2015:10). Section 4 looks more
closely at the “groups of people” aspect tying climate beliefs to sociopolitical identity.
<<Table 3 about here>>
Causality among the five indicators in Table 3 is difficult to untangle. We do not argue that in
general these indicators all should be combined into one latent variable, although that could work
for some purposes. But whether climate-change views are theoretically understood as an
indicator for identity, or just strongly caused by identity, their shared variance raises statistical
and interpretive problems for many published analyses. Research that includes climate-change
beliefs alongside other political indicators among the independent variables is forcing estimation
of separate effects from correlated and causally interconnected measures, potentially yielding
unstable results while understating the real effects of political identity.

4. Multiplicative Effects of Same-Party Friends
Nationwide surveys find that Americans increasingly choose to associate socially with people
who share their political orientation; and that people who do so tend to have more negative
feelings about other groups (Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Pew Research Center 2014, 2016,
2017). Causality presumably operates in both directions, with stronger partisans choosing likeminded friends, and like-minded friends strengthening partisanship, in a positive feedback that
exacerbates polarization.
4.1. North Country interactions
The proposition that people with mostly like-minded friends are more polarized can be
formalized as an interaction hypothesis, testable by including the multiplicative effect of
party×friends or similar terms among the predictors of politically-linked opinions. The friends
question defined in Table 2 was developed for this purpose, and first fielded on the 2017 North
Country survey. Adjusted margins plots in Figure 2 visualize party4×friends interaction effects
on four environment-related dependent variables from that survey (definitions in Tables 1 and 2).
Panels 2a and 2b repeat findings described by Hamilton et al. (2018): having mostly same-party
friends steepens the impact of political identity on (2a) perception that recent North Country
winters have been warmer, which they have; and (2b) more general belief that humans are
changing the climate (asked after the winters question, which itself does not mention climate
change). All effects graphed in Figure 2 are calculated from weighted logit regression models
which include the same covariates described in Hamilton (2018): respondent age, sex, education,
party4×education interaction, and years lived in the region. Each panel gives the estimation
sample (n) for that analysis, and also the two-tailed t test probability (p) for that interaction
effect’s coefficient. Thus, the recent winters warmer analysis in panel 2a involved 1,443
respondents, and the interaction depicted is statistically significant (p = 0.006).
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Figure 2: Agreement that recent winters in the North Country have been warmer, human-caused climate
change is happening, wind energy development is important, and conservation rules have been a good
thing here — by political party and most friends are same party (definitions in Tables 1–2). Data from
2017 North Country survey; adjusted margins plots calculated from logit regression models consistent
with Hamilton et al. 2018.

Panels 2c and 2d in Figure 2 depict similar interactions from the same dataset that were not
discussed in the earlier paper. Having mostly same-party friends makes the most conservative
respondents (Tea Party supporters) significantly less likely to agree that wind-powered electricity
is important for their community’s future (2c), or that conservation rules restricting development
have generally been a good thing (2d). For consistency, panels 2c and 2d also are calculated from
weighted logit models having the same covariates as 2a and 2b. Details within each panel vary,
but all show the same general pattern: having mostly same-party friends significantly steepens
the partisan gradients affecting environment-related views.
4.2. Northeast Oregon interactions
Figure 3 graphs party4×friends interaction effects on four environmental dependent variables in
the 2018 northeast Oregon survey. The dependent variable for panel 3a is whether respondent
thinks that recent summers in that region have been warmer, on average, than summers 30 or 40
years ago. In reality the summers have warmed, affecting the frequency of large wildfires
(Hamilton et al. 2016a; Hartter et al. 2020). Panel 3b involves our standard climate-change
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question. Friends interactions significantly steepen the partisan gradients in 3a and 3b, similar to
their effects on the analogous winter-warming and climate-change questions in the North
Country survey of Figure 2. For consistency with Hartter et al. (2020), logit regression models
for panels 3a and 3b include age, sex, education and years resident as covariates, along with
party4×education interactions. P-values shown are for party4×friends interactions.

Figure 3: Agreement that recent summers in northeast Oregon have been warmer, human-caused
climate change is happening, renewable energy development is higher priority, and wolves should be
eliminated from this region — by political party and most friends are same party (definitions in Tables 1–
2). Data from 2018 northeast Oregon survey; margins plots calculated from logit regression models. For
panels a, b and c the covariates are age, sex, education, years resident, and party4×education
interaction. For panel d covariates are age, sex, education, newcomer/oldtimer status, county of
residence, and party4×education interaction.

Panel 3c shows a new analysis with the same predictors and covariates but a different dependent
variable: whether respondent thinks that renewable energy development (rather than increased
exploration for oil) should be a high priority for the US. Having mostly same-party friends again
steepens the partisan gradient, but its impact happens mainly among Tea Party supporters, the
most conservative group. That pattern occurs more weakly with several other items as well, but
is equally pronounced, in a different dataset, with the thematically related wind-power question
in Figure 2c.
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Same-party friends, especially among Tea Partiers, also steepen partisan effects on the opinion
that wolves should be eliminated from eastern Oregon (panel 3d). Hamilton et al. (2020) discuss
the wolves issue in detail. For consistency, the logit model in 3d employs the same covariates
used for the wolves analysis in that earlier paper. As with all other panels in Figures 2 and 3, the
party4×friends interaction in 3d is significant (p < 0.0005).
Analyzing these same 2018 Oregon data, Hartter et al. (2020) note an important topic where
party×friends interaction effects are not evident: there is bipartisan agreement on the increasing
frequency of large wildfires in the region. This exception to the interaction patterns seen with
other topics in Figure 3 makes sense in terms of local reality, given the very high salience of
rising wildfire risks. More generally, it highlights that such interactions should be viewed as
testable hypotheses, with illuminating results either way.
4.3. New Hampshire interactions
Figure 4 plots a previously unpublished set of interactions predicting climate-change beliefs
(climate changing, defined in Table 1), based on all 2018–2020 New Hampshire surveys that
asked the friends question. These New Hampshire surveys carried a wider range of political
questions than did the North Country or Oregon surveys, as illustrated previously with the four
charts in Figure 1. In Figure 4 we demonstrate political identity×friends-type interactions in
simple 2-predictor models involving each of the four political indicators: ideology, party (here a
7-category version), Trump approval and Fox News viewing. Estimation samples, limited by the
friends question, are smaller than those charted in Figure 1 but still 1,200 or more in each panel.
These results, calculated from the weighted logit regression models in Table 4, show interaction
effects on climate-change views (definitions in Tables 1 and 2). In each case, having same-party
friends steepens the effects of political identity, in the same way seen with other variables and
datasets in Figures 2 and 3. Three of the four interactions (ideology9×friends, party7×friends
and Trump×friends) are statistically significant, while the fourth (Fox×friends) falls just short of
significance (p = 0.063). In all four panels, multiplicative effects from same-party friends appear
strongest among conservatives, resembling the tendency seen earlier in Figures 2a, 2c, 3c and 3d.
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Figure 4: Agreement that human-caused climate change is happening — by four different indicators of
political identity, and most friends are same party (definitions in Tables 1–2). Data from 2018–2020 New
Hampshire surveys; margins plots calculated from logit regression models in Table 4.

<<Table 4 about here>>
Of the 12 interactions plotted in Figures 2, 3 and 4, seven depict new results, while five show
results from earlier papers. The earlier analyses inspired a search for further examples, soon
found within both the original datasets (North Country and northeast Oregon) and in new data
from New Hampshire. Figures 2c, 2d, 3c, and all panels in Figure 4 are the new results here, but
the big picture comes from bringing all 12 graphs together.

5. Discussion
Figures 2, 3 and 4 show political identity×friends interactions with similar meanings across
different regional datasets, political-identity indicators, and environment-related dependent
variables. The replications make a case for exploring such effects more widely in research.
Under what conditions do interactions of this nature arise? Are they becoming more prevalent?
Are they most common in rural settings, such as our North Country and northeast Oregon
surveys? At this point, the pattern has not been demonstrated as broadly as political
identity×education-type interactions. Nor do identity×friends interactions exhibit the dramatic
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sign-reversal effects of identity×education. But the identity×friends interactions add new
elements to our understanding, in part by making the “socio” part of sociopolitical explicit.
The steepening effects of same-party friends might not appear visually dramatic when contrasted
with main effects that already are steep, as in many of these graphs. Quantitatively, however,
they can make a big difference. In Figure 3d, for example, the partisan gap on favoring
elimination of wolves is almost three times wider (about 55 points) among people with mostly
same-party friends, compared with those having mixed or different-party friends (20 points).
Figure 2c shows another threefold multiplication: the gap regarding importance of local wind
power is more than 30 points given same-party friends, compared with just over 10 points
otherwise. These issues have practical importance, and widening gaps could put policy
compromise out of reach.
A 2014 report from Pew Research Center observed that
“‘Ideological silos’ are now common on both the left and right. People with
down-the-line ideological positions — especially conservatives — are more likely
than others to say that most of their close friends share their political views.”
The political identity×friends graphs shown above depict what looks like siloing at both ends of
the spectrum — liberals and conservatives with mostly same-party friends are farther apart than
their mixed-party peers, across many issues. This likely reflects positive feedback: partisans
choose like-minded friends, and like-minded friends (or the perception that most friends are likeminded) make one more partisan. Although social scientists and journalists often describe
polarization with implicitly symmetrical terms, something happening on both sides, the Pew
statement notes a critical asymmetry: it happens most among conservatives. Similar asymmetry
appears in our findings as well. In many instances (most strikingly, the wind power/renewable
energy questions on two different surveys), we see that same-party friends make a bigger
difference on the conservative side of our graphs. Moreover, confirming Morin-Chassé and
Lachapelle (2019), we find that acceptance of anthropogenic climate change is unrelated related
to strength of ideological or partisan identification among liberals/Democrats, whereas it is
strongly related among conservatives/Republicans.
The climate-change case highlights substantive asymmetry. When liberals recognize the reality
of anthropogenic climate change, their views align with their political elites, it is true — but also
with the overwhelming majority of scientists, whose expertise liberals are generally more
inclined to trust (Carmichael et al. 2017; Hamilton 2015b). Increasingly, these views also align
with physical-world experience and news reports of current events, from altered seasons to more
extreme weather (as documented in USGCRP 2017). Conservatives rejecting the reality of
anthropogenic climate change likewise align with their political elites, but they do so in
contradiction to most scientists or sometimes even local weather, as Hamilton and LemckeStampone (2016) and many other studies observe. The concept of ideological silos (or more
accurately, sociopolitical silos) should not become a presumptive explanation for group
differences, because such differences do not necessarily reflect narrowly-sourced information.
Within-group homogeneity of views might indeed reflect politically-guided information filtering,
as the “silo” term implies. But alternatively, such homogeneity could for other groups reflect
information drawn from diverse sources that reinforce each other because they describe the same
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reality — such as science, news reports, and personal experience of extreme weather or shifting
seasons.

6. Conclusion
The social bases of environmental concern — especially age, gender, education and political
identity — have been fairly stable, making these among the best-replicated findings of
contemporary social science. Beyond confirming the broad patterns identified by Van Liere and
Dunlap (1980), newer US studies have observed the now-overwhelming dominance of political
factors compared with other individual and situational predictors. More subtly, many studies
report political identity×education-type interactions such that education shows positive effects on
environmental concern among liberals and moderates, but no effects or even negative effects
among the most conservative. The present study builds cumulatively on past findings by adding
support for three newer propositions: (1) strength of political identification predicts climatechange views among conservatives more than it does among liberals, suggesting that
conservatives’ views are more politically determined; (2) climate-change views are so well
correlated with ideology, party, Trump approval and watching Fox News that for practical if not
theoretical purposes, all five might be conceived as measuring the same underlying dimension;
and (3) especially among conservatives, having mostly same-party friends intensifies the
already-strong effects of political identity on environmental views including climate,
conservation, renewable energy and wildlife management. Each proposition elaborates on the
well-established linkage between conservative identity and lower concern about the environment
which, especially in connection with climate change, extends to rejecting the relevant science.
Studies currently in progress observe conservative science rejection spilling over, with disastrous
consequences, to medical science regarding COVID-19.
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Table 1: Definitions of dependent variables from North Country, NE Oregon and New
Hampshire surveys. Shown with coding used for analyses of Figures 2–4 and Tables 3–4.

Climate changing (all surveys) — “Which of the following three statements do you think is more accurate?”
Climate change is happening now, caused mainly by human activities (1)
Climate change is happening now, but caused mainly by natural forces (0)
Climate change is not happening now (0)
Don’t know/no answer (0)
Recent winters warmer (North Country) — “Which of the following statements do you think is more accurate?
Northern New England winter temperatures over the past 20 years have been ...”
Warmer, on average, than winters 30 or 40 years ago (1)
About the same, on average, as winters 30 or 40 years ago (0)
Cooler, on average, than winters 30 or 40 years ago (0)
Don’t know/no answer (0)
Wind power important (North Country) — “How important you think wind-powered electricity generation is for
your community’s future?”
Very important (1)
Somewhat important (1)
Not important (0)
Don’t know/no answer (0)
Conservation rules good (North Country) — “Have conservation or environmental rules that restrict development
generally been a good thing for your community (1), a bad thing (0), or have they had no effect (0)?”
Recent summers warmer (NE Oregon) — “Which of the following statements about past climate in this region do
you believe is most accurate? Northeast Oregon summer temperatures over the past 20 years ...”
Have been warmer, on average, than summers 30 or 40 years ago (1)
Have been cooler, on average, than summers 30 or 40 years ago (0)
Have been about the same, on average, as summers 30 or 40 years ago (0)
Don’t know/no answer (0)
Renewable energy priority (NE Oregon) — “For the future of this country, which do you think should be a higher
priority?
Increased use of wind, solar and renewable energy sources (1)
Increased exploration and drilling for oil (0)
Don’t know/no answer (0)
Eliminate wolves (NE Oregon) — “Which of the following four statements about wolves in eastern Oregon comes
closest to your personal beliefs?”
Wolves should be eliminated from eastern Oregon (1)
Limited hunting of wolves should be allowed (0)
Wolves should not be hunted, but landowners compensated for losses (0)
Wolves should not be hunted, and no landowner compensation is needed (0)
Don’t know/no answer (0)
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Table 2: Definitions of sociopolitical indicators from North Country, NE Oregon and New
Hampshire surveys. Shown with coding used for analyses of Figures 2–4 and Tables 3–4.

Ideology — “In politics, do you generally think of yourself as a liberal, a moderate, or a conservative?”
Extremely liberal (–4)
Fairly liberal (–3)
Somewhat liberal (–2)
Moderate, leans liberal (–1)
Moderate, leans neither (0)
Moderate, leans conservative (+1)
Somewhat conservative (+2)
Fairly conservative (+3)
Extremely conservative (+4)
Party7 — “Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent or
what?”
Strong Democrat (–3)
Not very strong Democrat (–2)
Independent, closer to Democrat (–1)
Independent, closer to neither (0)
Independent, closer to Republican (+1)
Not very strong Republican (+2)
Strong Republican (+3)
Party4 — Defined from combination of two questions: Party7 and “Overall would you say you support the political
movement known as the Tea Party, you oppose the Tea Party, or that you neither support nor oppose it?”
Democrat (–1 if strong D, not strong D, or Independent closer to D)
Independent (0 if Independent, closer to neither)
Republican (+1 if strong R, not strong R, or Independent closer to R)
Tea Party (+2 if support Tea Party)
Trump approval — “Do you approve or disapprove of the way Donald Trump is handling his job as president?”
Strongly disapprove (–3)
Disapprove somewhat (–2)
Lean toward disapproving (–1)
Neither, not sure, don’t know (0)
Lean toward approving (+1)
Somewhat approve (+2)
Strongly approve (+3)
Watch Fox News — “How often, if ever, do you watch Fox News?”
Never/don’t know (0)
Occasionally (1)
Several times a week (2)
Every day (3)
Friends — “Would you say that most of your friends prefer the same political party that you do (1)? Or do most
prefer different parties (0)? Or are they about evenly divided (0)?”
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Table 3: Principal components factor analysis of four political-identity indicators and climatechange views. New Hampshire survey data from 2017–2020; n = 2,093. Variable definitions and
coding given in Tables 1–2.

Factor
1
2
3
4
5

Eigenvalue
3.397
0.558
0.514
0.279
0.252

Proportion
of Variance
0.679
0.112
0.103
0.056
0.051

Cumulative
0.679
0.791
0.894
0.949
1.000

One factor with eigenvalue >1 retained, explaining 67.9% of total variance. Theta reliability θ = 0.88.
Indicator
Variable
Ideology
Party7
Trump approval
Watch Fox News
Climate changing

Factor 1
Loading
0.856
0.852
0.890
0.753
–0.761

Unique
Variance
0.267
0.275
0.207
0.433
0.421
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Table 4: Weighted logit regressions of agreement that human-caused climate change is
happening on political identity indicators, most friends same party, and political identity×friends
interactions. Dataset pools all New Hampshire surveys which asked the friends question (2018–
2020). Table shows logit coefficients, standard errors, t tests, probabilities, and estimation
sample size. Variable definitions and coding given in Tables 1–2.

Coef

SE

t

Prob

n

Ideology
Friends
Ideology×friends

–0.707
–0.533
0.201

0.068
0.187
0.087

–10.29
–0.29
2.32

0.000
0.775
0.020

1,623

Party7
Friends
Party7×friends

–0.856
–0.074
0.324

0.083
0.175
0.103

–10.28
–0.42
3.15

0.000
0.672
0.002

1,626

Trump
Friends
Trump×friends

–0.707
–0.135
0.224

0.058
0.185
0.068

–12.10
–0.73
3.30

0.000
0.466
0.001

1,741

Fox
Friends
Fox×friends

–1.148
–0.315
0.321

0.149
0.240
0.173

–7.72
–1.31
1.86

0.000
0.189
0.063

1,218
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